Cultural Diplomacy and The National Interest: In Search of a 21st-Century Perspective

Overview

Interest in public and cultural diplomacy, after a long post-Cold War decline, has surged in the last few years. This new focus inside and outside government has two causes: first, the 9/11 terrorist attacks and the perception that the U.S. is losing a war of culture against Islamic extremists; and second, the documented global collapse of positive public sentiment toward the U.S. But the task facing policy leaders – translating interest into action – must accommodate the reality that government cultural work has been diminished in scope even as trade in cultural products and Internet communication has increased the complexity and informal character of cross-cultural communication.

The current state of U.S. cultural and public diplomacy has been reviewed by numerous special commissions and elite bodies, ranging from the 9/11 Commission to the RAND Corporation, from Congress’s Governmental Accountability Office (GAO) to the Council on Foreign Relations. Resulting recommendations have emphasized increased funding, better coordination, increased State Department programming, and more private-sector partnership to support programming that the State Department and governmental broadcasting outlets are already producing.

However, because cultural work constitutes a long-term, diffuse, and largely immeasurable solution to a pressing problem in an age of quick fixes, the larger concept of cultural diplomacy – defined most broadly as the propagation of American culture and ideals around the world – tends to get short shift in these presentations. In addition, the lion’s share of American cultural content is conveyed by private-sector film, recording, and broadcasting industries, functioning beyond the realm of official policy objectives. Yet any meaningful, real-world cultural-diplomacy policy ought to take into account the considerable impact of private-sector cultural products – such as movies, music, and television – on international sentiments toward the U.S.

Traditionally, the conventional definition of cultural diplomacy encompasses government-sponsored broadcasting, educational exchanges, cultural programming, and information or knowledge flow. In contrast, this report, grounded in a broad definition of cultural diplomacy, steps back to consider all the ways that images and symbols of U.S. culture and ideals are transmitted abroad. Accordingly, this report takes into account U.S. private-sector cultural exports – which today dwarf government-funded or...
agency — implemented cultural work — as well as the efforts mounted by some corporations and non-governmental organizations in an attempt to influence the way the U.S. and its culture and values are perceived in the world.

Since 9/11, it is true that U.S. channels of cultural communication have received increased funding and attention. Nevertheless, problems remain: lack of coordination, limited funding, absence of expertise. There exists no public diplomacy hierarchy capable of exerting control over the dozens of government entities that engage in public diplomacy-like activities; some, like the Defense Department, are virtually immune to outside interference. Public diplomacy media, including publications, too often lack marketing expertise and familiarity with the cultures of their highest-priority targets in non-elite populations in the Arab and Muslim worlds. As a result, many expensive, highly-touted media campaigns have fallen flat, at times inadvertently conveying conflicting messages that seem to cancel each other out.

Given the pressure for immediate, measurable results on specific policy issues, any policy of cultural exchange — burdened by assumptions of give-and-take, mutual learning, and creative processes that rarely register in exit polling — stands at a significant disadvantage in the constant struggle for government attention and funding. Our government remains most comfortable with short-term, transactional exchanges and has not embraced the long-term goal of mutual trust conveyed by the European concept of “mutuality.” Yet in each area — official, business, non-governmental — it appears that diplomatic initiatives produce better results when they showcase culture, touch on culture, or at least take it into account. And to be effective, as this report will discuss, cultural diplomacy appears to require patience and a long view.

Despite obvious obstacles, conditions for a vibrant cultural diplomacy effort are in place: a cultural establishment that is outward-looking, future-focused, and eager to make art that is engaged with, not estranged from, the wider world; a wide variety of public and private institutions active in public diplomacy capable of accommodating expanded cultural offerings; and a wide variety of active or potential funders. The diverse and democratic character of America’s expressive life makes it a legitimate asset in advancing our national reputation. Further, America’s entertainment industries possess global business models and technologies capable of reaching even the most remote societies. Together, America’s many government, NGO, and private-sector cultural organizations constitute a multifaceted, decentralized, de facto ministry of culture. With appropriate policy direction and effective coordination, this wide array of capable cultural ambassadors can define for themselves, and for us, the key components of a U.S. cultural message. They can then proceed to offer programming to the institutions scrambling for public diplomacy content.
This report begins by redefining “cultural diplomacy” in light of current events, and then reviews the history and current state of cultural diplomacy efforts. Our report concludes by identifying key challenges, possible initiatives, and essential questions that, if engaged, can enable cultural institutions, government agencies, arts industries, policy makers, and private sector leaders to harness the global movement of our expressive life to advance our national goals.
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I. Redefining Cultural Diplomacy for the 21st Century

As you know, the image of our country is a montage of our foreign policy, the brands we market, and the entertainment we export. It could be referred to as a cocktail of ‘Rummy’ [Secretary Rumsfeld] and Coke, with Madonna on the side.

– Keith Reinhard, chairman, DDB Worldwide, and president, Business for Diplomatic Action

For a country that has neither a Department of Cultural Affairs nor a Ministry of Culture, the U.S. has at times in its past mounted sweeping and highly effective cultural diplomacy initiatives. During the Cold War (1945–1990), Voice of America radio broadcasts made jazz the unofficial anthem of a generation of Soviet dissidents. In the '60s and '70s, exchange programs exposed future world leaders from Britain and Poland, Tanzania and Indonesia to the vibrancy and openness of all varieties of American culture – whether popular, “high,” or political.

Measured against standards implied by classic definitions of cultural diplomacy, the U.S. has been strong in the past. As this report will detail, it appears less so now.

To begin with, what is “cultural diplomacy”?

Cultural diplomacy is a domain of diplomacy concerned with establishing, developing and sustaining relations with foreign states by way of culture, art and education. It is also a proactive process of external projection in which a nation's institutions, value system and unique cultural personality are promoted at a bilateral and multilateral level.

At its core, this sense of cultural diplomacy includes what might be described as a nation’s “expressive life,” but it also incorporates the exchange of values and overarching ideas. Historically, cultural diplomacy has often been viewed as a subset of “public diplomacy,” a program of exchange that includes art, education, and ideas, but also incorporates health care and community and economic development, activities beyond the cultural realm. However, following the tragedy of 9/11, the challenge of global terrorism has been characterized as a “cultural” problem. Meanwhile, the functional boundaries of the U.S. government’s public diplomacy have been pulled in to encompass little more than public relations or advertising programs intended to modify attitudes toward the
U.S. (significantly, about half of the current U.S. public diplomacy budget is spent on radio and television broadcasting).

Further, during the past half-century, the cosmopolitan sense of “Culture” as the output of artistic and intellectual elites has been gradually supplanted by “culture,” with a lower-case “c,” an anthropological construct encompassing a broad range of religious, political, and creative practices that together constitute the essential character of societies and communities. United Nations declarations and UNESCO accords memorialize this modern sense of “culture” as a multifaceted reflection of a nation’s character.

Conversations about a renewed interest in American cultural diplomacy are complicated by the fact that the phrase denotes different things in different contexts. Therefore, it is important to interrogate every appearance of “cultural diplomacy” and its synonyms to determine exactly what is intended. At a minimum, any broad approach to cultural diplomacy must acknowledge 1) the actions of diplomats in the cultural sphere, 2) the shaping of media content by government in order to influence international public opinion (sometimes “public diplomacy” is used this way), 3) long-term efforts to harmonize the values and goals of disparate cultures (“mutuality”), and 4) intervention in informal cultural relations (trade, immigration, etc.) in order to produce a policy outcome. Sometimes cultural diplomacy suggests long-term exchange of values; in other contexts it means little more than “public relations.” In addition, many supporters of cultural interaction assume that cultural diplomacy begins and ends with the exchange of artists and art works (“arts diplomacy”), although in the U.S. staff and funds devoted to such exchanges have always constituted a small component of the U.S. global cultural agenda.

Culture gained a formal place in American diplomacy at the start of the Cold War. Soviet Communism was perceived to pose not just a military and diplomatic threat, but also a fundamental challenge to the American way of life. America’s culture – from high art, literature and philosophy to journalism, popular music, and even interior design – was drafted into the struggle for global public opinion.

Since then, however, the combination of new technology, the vigor of American capitalism, and America’s famously decentralized society with its preference for do-it-yourself-ism over government bureaucracy have meant that the most vibrant, and the most viewed, projections of America’s “institutions, value system and unique cultural personality” (as defined above) are happening outside government in the private sector.
Today the film, music, and television industries are America’s leading de facto cultural diplomats. In a second tier behind these entertainment corporations are other industries, as well as the programs of multiple government agencies and the parallel efforts of some non-governmental organizations. In some senses, the “diplomacy” with the greatest cultural impact is U.S. trade policy, a policy realm that works to set the conditions under which U.S. products (cultural and otherwise) are distributed in other nations. In the U.S. system, any meaningful discussion of cultural diplomacy must include the global impact of the products of U.S. entertainment industries, including their promotion and overseas trade.

For this report, then, the term “culture” is meant to include American values as well as the music, drama, visual art, dance, literature, and moving images that make up our expressive life. Similarly, “cultural diplomacy” is understood to refer to all the ways American culture is moved around the world. Lastly, given contemporary assumptions here and abroad, this report uses “cultural diplomacy” as the overarching, umbrella term, with “public diplomacy” as a tactical subset.

II. The Creation of American Cultural Diplomacy: Cold War and Before

Few Americans appreciate the degree to which knowledge about American culture, whether acquired by participating in our exchange programs, attending our cultural presentations, or simply listening to the Voice of America, contributed to the death of communism.

— Rajan Menon

Introduction

Official American cultural diplomacy had its heyday during the Cold War. Touring cultural programs, libraries, educational exchanges, and visits – along with clandestine support for non-governmental intellectual publications and conferences – served the goal of promoting the quality, vibrancy, and diversity of American cultural life in contrast to that of its Soviet communist adversary. While a number of Cold War initiatives did depend on cooperation from not-for-profit and private-sector organizations, the overwhelming majority was government planned and directed. Government’s role was central in an era when large swathes of the globe simply had no access to U.S. cultural products except those
facilitated by official radio, embassy libraries, or performance troupes that toured with U.S. support.

For most of our country’s history, American cultural diplomacy’s public-private partnerships have derived their energy and character from a group of elite public figures – the “East Coast Establishment”: individuals of wealth, learning, and refinement who moved easily back and forth among lofty positions in government, industry, and cultural institutions. This establishment was ultimately tainted by the disastrous end of the Vietnam War and supplanted by the diversification of American political and cultural life. Nevertheless, the consensus of elites that had created cultural outreach programming held – until the Cold War’s end.

Roots in the Private Sector

The roots of U.S. cultural diplomacy are, perhaps surprisingly, as much private as governmental. Indeed, prior to the Cold War, cultural exchange was for the most part understood as a non-governmental activity into which officials were hesitant to intrude. One author traces America’s beginnings in cultural diplomacy to the Enlightenment spirit of the eighteenth century, which led to the establishment of national learned societies. By the mid-1700s, Benjamin Franklin had been selected for membership in the Spanish Academy of History, and the American Philosophical Society was electing Europeans and Latin Americans as corresponding members. One hundred years later, the steady stream of wealthy Americans paying cultural visits to Europe was augmented by the flow of American missionaries to Asia, the Middle East, and Africa. The missionaries recruited students from these regions back to the United States, and they in turn conveyed American ideas, values, and institutions – secular as well as religious – back to their native countries.

By the early 1900s, American museums and universities were sponsoring expeditions abroad while simultaneously mounting efforts to attract foreign scholars to positions in their American headquarters. European scientists and researchers took up positions at American museums while not-for-profit leaders sought to influence public policy on behalf of culture. Such interventions could be bold: Following the abortive Boxer Rebellion in China (1899–1900), James Angell, U.S. Minister to China and president of the University of Michigan, campaigned successfully with other university presidents to have the American share of the indemnity paid by China returned – on condition that the funds be used to send Chinese students to the United States.
Learned societies and foundations also began to fund “education, research, artistic touring companies and international exchanges of all kinds...nongovernmental educational exchanges were the most important cultural link between the U.S. and the rest of the world until the period preceding World War II.”

The overlap between the leadership of these private philanthropic organizations and appointed government executives at the heights of American diplomacy was considerable. In those days both activities were the preserves of the East Coast establishment. James Angell served as U.S. envoy to China and president of the University of Michigan simultaneously. Similarly, Elihu Root, Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, moved easily from the New York bar to Roosevelt’s Cabinet to the U.S. Senate and on to the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. This conflation of leadership roles endowed America’s cultural outreach with a unique character it has never entirely lost: “private, voluntary, supported by philanthropy, and juxtaposing idealistic objectives with an elite perspective that recast the old missionary impulse in secular terms.”

It should come as no surprise that when the State Department established a Division of Cultural Relations in 1938, the agency acted hesitantly, sensitive to the leading role of the private sector. Britain and France had launched cultural diplomacy initiatives earlier, but the impetus for the new division in the State Department came not from Europe but from Latin America – first growing out of the U.S. Good Neighbor Policy of the period and then out of concern that Germany, Italy, and Japan would convert Latin American countries to the Axis side. However, by advancing a cultural agenda into Latin American countries that shared important hemispheric values, the Division of Cultural Relations scored important successes that paved the way for the expansion of cultural diplomacy after World War II.

The Expansion of U.S. Government Outreach during the Cold War

America’s postwar cultural diplomacy agenda can be traced to improvised initiatives in 1945 Berlin. That year, following the collapse of the Nazi regime, the Soviets quickly re-opened the State Opera and opened a House of Culture in central Berlin, even as “the stench of bodies still hung about the ruins.” The U.S. promptly responded by establishing “America Houses,” disseminating literature, later promoting theater and opera as well as popular music and magazines. By 1946, the
State Department’s Office of Information and Cultural Affairs directed 76 outposts around the world, each of which offered daily news from Washington as well as books, exhibits, and films. In its early years, the Voice of America, founded in 1942, produced 36 hours of radio broadcasting each week, offering culture and music as well as news and commentary in 24 languages.  

Information functions administered by the State Department and various other agencies were combined in the new U.S. Information Agency (USIA) in 1953. However, USIA did not take over educational exchanges and cultural affairs from the State Department until 1978. 

U.S. government Cold War cultural diplomacy programming can be broken down into a few key categories:

- **Cultural exchange programs**, sponsored by the State Department until 1978 and then by USIA, which sent artists, art works, filmmakers, writers, and performers overseas;
- **American Libraries and Centers**, sponsored by USIA, which offered a range of literature, exhibits, films, speakers, and discussions as well as news and English lessons;
- **Radio Broadcasting**, first Voice of America and later Radio Free Europe, Radio Liberty, and others (all housed within USIA), which broadcast cultural content to parts of the world where it was unavailable or forbidden;
- **Student, professional, and citizen exchanges**, conducted under the auspices of the State Department until 1978, which have brought more than 250,000 visitors to the U.S. and more than 100,000 Americans abroad. While not targeted directly at cultural affairs in most cases, these exchanges did have profound effects in spreading a positive view of American culture in general and in building appetites for American cultural products.

The list of U.S. government Cold War cultural diplomacy programming would not be complete, however, without a mention of another key player in American cultural diplomacy – the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), which provided clandestine support for pro-U.S. cultural programming in this era. In fact, from the 1940s through the 1960s, cultural diplomacy’s shadowy second home was the CIA, which made use of American culture – and American and European cultural leaders – in its own propaganda struggle against the Soviets.

Unchallenged, undetected for over twenty years, America’s spying establishment operated a sophisticated, substantially endowed cultural front in the West, for the West, in the name of freedom of expression.
Defining the Cold War as a ‘battle for men’s minds,’ it stockpiled a vast arsenal of cultural weapons: journals, books, conferences, seminars, art exhibitions, concerts, awards.\(^{13}\)

These arrangements came to an apparent end in the late 1960s, collapsing under other accusations of CIA misdeeds. But CIA sponsorship had nourished a generation of intellectuals and some of the leading publications of the day in the U.S., Europe, India, Latin America, and elsewhere. Revelations of front foundations and money laundering to provide support for allegedly independent thinkers, however, left a lasting queasiness around the notion of the U.S. government’s role in cultural diplomacy.

**Partnerships with Not-for-Profits**

As U.S. government-sponsored exchange and visitor programs grew, each developed partnerships with existing organizations – and built entirely new not-for-profits – to increase the number of participants. The International Visitor Program, for example, spawned a National Council for International Visitors, and more than 90 local volunteer councils, which arranged programs and hosted visitors from abroad. Non-governmental organizations (such as Sister Cities International) accepted government support or contracted with the U.S. government to run exchange programs. Universities were deeply involved with the Fulbright Scholar Program (founded: 1946) and various other international scholarship and fellowship programs.

These partnerships exhibited authentic sharing of capabilities and resources, and the public diplomacy programs could not, in many cases, have functioned without them. Nevertheless, for all the assistance that not-for-profits provided during the Cold War, it was the U.S. government that set the agenda in advancing foreign exchange.

**Results of Cold War Programs**

_Some fifty thousand Soviets visited the United States under various exchange programs between 1958 and 1988. They came as scholars and students, scientists and engineers, writers and journalists, government and party officials, musicians, dancers, and athletes – and among them were more than a few KGB officers. They came, they saw, they were conquered, and the Soviet Union would never again be the same._\(^{14}\)

– Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War
The raw numbers alone are impressive: more than 100,000 foreigners visited the U.S. under the International Visitors program in 50 years. 1,500 of them became cabinet-level ministers in their home countries; 177 became heads of state or government, including Tony Blair, Margaret Thatcher, Anwar Sadat, Indira Gandhi, Julius Nyerere (the first president of Tanzania), and Oscar Arias (the Nobel Peace Prize–winning president of Costa Rica). The Fulbright program for educational exchange sponsored another 255,000 foreigners and Americans – among them future Nobel and Pulitzer prizewinners and artists as well as future government and business leaders.

More Americans visited the Soviet Union over this period than Soviets visited America. There were musicians and dance troupes of course, but students, entrepreneurs, and tourists were also part of the mix. The flow of culture sometimes took place in rarefied artistic realms: a generation of Soviet and Russian artists struggled to master improvisatory jazz styles they heard in secret over the Voice of America. But low culture also played its part: American visitors to the Soviet Union brought in blue jeans and sneakers to sell or swap, fueling the seemingly inexhaustible enthusiasm of Soviet young people for American style and popular culture, which symbolized our nation’s openness and informality.

The effects of these exchanges, as so often with cultural products, are hard to quantify, but they are real. At the most positive end of the spectrum, some writers have argued that broad exposure to American culture, especially among elites, served to illuminate the internal inadequacies and irrationalities of the Soviet system and thus to hasten its decline and collapse.

But overall the exchanges had even wider, more diffuse effects, the remains of which have continued to serve the U.S. well in the post-Cold War period. A broadly positive view of American culture took root globally and endured into the 21st century. As late as 2001, for example, international political, cultural, and business leaders told pollsters that American culture was not a significant cause of hostility to the U.S. Likewise, as recently as 2002, majorities in 9 of 10 Muslim nations had positive views of U.S. films and television.

Yet the positive effects of the Cold War–era programs are beginning to wear off. An American official recently asked a Polish politician why his country had supported the U.S. in Iraq. The response speaks volumes about the long-lasting positive effects of Cold War cultural exchange and, conversely, the potential vacuum created by the paucity of effective cultural exchange programs today:
I look around the Polish Cabinet and see that almost every single person spent a year or more studying or teaching in the United States. I look at the next generations of Polish leaders and see that almost none of them have the same experience. They would not make the same decision.18

Significantly, at the same time that these governmental programs provided the first taste of U.S. culture for many nations around the world (during the period 1945-1990), the private-sector capacity to deliver cultural products overseas, and the sector’s interest in doing so, grew dramatically. The U.S. government’s cultural diplomacy had paved the way – and as official cultural diplomacy receded in the 1990s, private-sector cultural exports would more than take its place, with vital differences.

III. Defining the Problem Today

Recommendation: Just as we did in the Cold War, we need to defend our ideals abroad vigorously. America does stand up for its values. The United States defended, and still defends, Muslims against tyrants and criminals in Somalia, Bosnia, Kosovo, Afghanistan, and Iraq. If the United States does not act aggressively to define itself in the Islamic world, the extremists will gladly do the job for us.

Σ • Recognizing that Arab and Muslim audiences rely on satellite television and radio, the government has begun some promising initiatives in television and radio broadcasting to the Arab world, Iran, and Afghanistan. These efforts are beginning to reach large audiences. The Broadcasting Board of Governors has asked for much larger resources. It should get them.

Σ • The United States should rebuild the scholarship, exchange, and library programs that reach out to young people and offer them knowledge and hope. Where such assistance is provided, it should be identified as coming from the citizens of the United States.

— The 9/11 Commission Report 19

Today, fifteen years after the Cold War ended, the challenge posed by extreme Islamic ideologies has sparked new interest in public and cultural diplomacy. As the excerpt from the Report of the 9/11 Commission
quoted above makes clear, a new expectation has arisen, shared broadly across the political spectrum, that cultural diplomacy, including long- and short-term strategies, constitutes a vital piece of the U.S. arsenal in the long-term war against terrorism.

However, Cold War cultural strategies may prove ineffective in a 21st-century setting. Instead of a mirror-image government adversary offering its unique cultural offensive of the sort the U.S. faced in Soviet Communism, Islamic extremism is decentralized and diffuse. True, like the U.S., radical Muslims lack a Ministry of Culture or Department of Cultural Affairs. However, their religious and moralistic cultural agenda infuses all of their activities even though their conservative message is aimed primarily at their own co-religionists. In some parts of the world, the U.S. must combat – or at least cope with – this cultural agenda head on. However, in much of the world, the U.S. does not so much compete directly with Islamic extremists as with a more complex challenge – the widespread set of negative perceptions that have grown up around the U.S. itself.

In the current competition for global goodwill, the U.S. government is no longer the primary purveyor of cultural goods, nor is government the primary message bearer. Where once U.S.-sponsored radio broadcasts, libraries, and tours were the only points of contact with U.S. culture for large segments of the planet, today those vehicles appear as quaint anachronisms submerged beneath a modern-day tide of private-sector cultural exports (a point to be considered at greater length in Section V).

During the Cold War, cultural difference could be framed as a byproduct of the competition between two very different economic, political, and philosophical systems. U.S. culture could assert and maintain its superiority and value because it stood as a metaphor for the open, free-market society from which it grew. (Our adversaries, of course, believed just the opposite.) Today the challenge is different; culture itself sometimes seems to be at the core, not the periphery, of the problem.

There is a growing cultural gulf between the United States and much of the world. These two groups view the world through vastly different cultural lenses that impose conflicting sets of values…Another source of tension is the broad sweep of American culture. Hollywood movies, television, advertising, business practices and fast-food chains from the United States are provoking a backlash from some who feel that their culture is being overrun.20
It is no doubt true that the content and aggressive reach of American films and TV contribute to negative perceptions of the U.S. However, two important ideas have emerged that move beyond the notion that American popular culture is at the root of our global image problem.

The first of these ideas: It is important to acknowledge the potential of American high culture – specifically the role of American ideals and American scholarly research – to generate the seeds of hostility. It must be remembered that, historically, much of U.S. cultural diplomacy targeted cultural and political elites in other societies. In fact, investment in the exchange of cosmopolitan elite art and intellectualism has been the default strategy of U.S. cultural diplomacy since its inception in the 1930s. So, while it is easy to assume that the waves of U.S. pop-culture exports are leaving high culture behind, and it is certainly true that U.S. institutions of high culture have never generated the popular acceptance or revenue streams claimed by commercial entertainment, the elite-to-elite character of much cultural exchange has had lasting effects. International elites are (or believe they are) steeped in U.S. intellectual culture, chiefly through TV and radio news, print media, and access to the American system of higher education.

Although this kind of cross-cultural influence cannot be measured in cassettes sold or royalties paid, some aspects of U.S. high culture and intellectual culture have become as ubiquitous as McDonald’s and Britney Spears. And, like fast food and pop hits, American ideas possess the same potential to evoke a volatile mixture of allure and revulsion. The economist Jagdish Bhagwati puts it this way:

The spread of “low” culture, symbolized by McDonald’s and Coke, accentuates intergenerational conflicts and reinforces the nostalgia that the old often feel about the loss of local culture. But the resentment extends to “high” culture as well. In particular, the U.S. is at the cutting edge of women’s rights, children’s rights and much else that the more traditional, at times feudal or oligarchic, regimes elsewhere find threatening to their cultural and social order. America makes waves which threaten to drown them.21

Apart from the much publicized flood of American pop culture, educated and affluent audiences in target countries have long possessed their own predetermined picture of U.S. culture: “For the most part, elite audiences in the Middle East are already consuming U.S. broadcasting; they often speak English and watch CNN and other mainstream
American channels.” At best, this spread of U.S. values among international elites constitutes a reservoir of empowered goodwill; at worst, shared opinions and assumptions can alienate foreign leaders from their own non-elite citizenry.

The second idea: Despite widespread assumptions about the negative impact of American TV and movies, the data are mixed regarding the extent to which U.S. cultural exports trigger a negative perception of the U.S. Some business leaders cite surveys that suggest the incidence of boycott and hostility to U.S. consumer goods is growing. Certainly the occasional spectacular incident – such as the string of attacks on Kentucky Fried Chicken outlets in Pakistan in 2005, including murders of local staff – would seem to confirm the point. But other studies, such as those conducted by the Pew Global Attitudes Project, find a less solid connection between cultural content and anti-American sentiment. For example, researcher Shibley Telhami attempted to find linkages between choice of media outlet by non-U.S. consumers and the resulting level of hostility. But he could find no such linkages:

In my surveys about Arab media, I tried to find out whether there's a direct relationship, a statistical relationship, between what people watch and their attitudes towards the U.S. I could not find any significant statistical relationship. People who don't watch al-Jazeera are as anti-American as people who do. People who have no satellite, people who watch CNN, tend to be as resentful. In the same way that you will find people who don't have Arab Television in Europe and Africa and Latin America who are resentful of America.

Of course, critiques of the impact of U.S. culture – high and low – have been around for a long time. But given the absence of evidence demonstrating a causal connection, it appears that culture functions as a contributing, rather than a determining, factor in global attitudes about America. After all, it is striking that the marked decline in global public opinion did not track the explosion of U.S. cultural exports in the 1990s but instead first picked up in the aftermath of the Vietnam War and emerged full-blown following changes in defense and immigration policies in the wake of 9/11.

This report will not attempt to resolve the longstanding debate between those who believe the collapse of global goodwill toward the U.S. is rooted in values of culture alone, and those who interpret the decline in trust as a response to concrete foreign policy actions. Instead, this report
posits that even a vigorous program of cultural diplomacy cannot completely counteract the effect of either values or policy in the international arena. What cultural diplomacy can do is convey those components of U.S. culture and society that are vibrant, appealing, enabling, inspiring, and most universal. And it can initiate and sustain dialogues about trust, openness, and mutual respect that can outlast the vicissitudes of policy and world events.

IV. The Shape of Current U.S. Cultural Diplomacy

How can a man in a cave out-communicate the world’s leading communications society?
— Richard Holbrooke

The cultural/public diplomacy establishment has not been maintained in the years since the end of the Cold War. On the contrary, their purpose apparently fulfilled, governmental institutions for public and cultural diplomacy were allowed to wither following the demise of the Soviet Union in 1990. In addition, the bureaucratic organization of cultural diplomacy efforts has undergone extensive revamping, beginning with the 1999 re-absorption of the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) by the State Department. Moreover, the traditional State Department hierarchy of international cultural work is today challenged by echelons of de facto public diplomacy practitioners in other government departments, from the Centers for Disease Control to the Defense Department.

A quick overview of the cultural-exchange landscape further illustrates the way in which cultural purposes are spread across government. As of 2003, there were 246 exchange programs implemented through 15 departments and 48 independent agencies. The programs, in aggregate, cost about $2 billion, and served primarily foreign nationals. While the State Department provided the largest portion of funds, its share was only 32 percent of the total. The scattered character of cultural exchange is typical of official U.S. government cultural work today. In the aggregate, these cultural programs sprinkled across a myriad of agencies are important, but only a few can be addressed in this report.

And, with the largest allocation of available funds, defense officials in Washington and military officers on the ground in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere, control significant budgets which can (and are) deployed in efforts to influence foreign views of America, inevitably without
coordination with or approval from the traditional public diplomacy establishment. In fact, no comprehensive survey of U.S. government defense-related public relations work has ever been undertaken (and security constraints would make such a study difficult). However, it is important to note that, in the elevated environment of post-9/11 policy making, a Defense Department study recommended the creation of a strategic communication advisory capacity within the national security structure – the most aggressive new information and communication proposal to surface within any department of the federal government.

After the 9/11 attacks and the beginning of the Iraq war, with one international public opinion poll after another indicating a collapse in esteem for America overseas, both increased funding and the attention of policy leaders have initiated a gradual resurgence in the U.S. commitment to public diplomacy. However, the ultimate depth of this engagement has not been determined. As this paper is written, public diplomacy is best described as functioning in a state of flux. In particular, any emerging cultural diplomacy initiative must balance the need to view cross-cultural communication and accommodation as a long-term process against the nearly irresistible pressure to produce instantaneous, politically measurable results.

What Does the Structure Look Like Today?

White House Leadership

Although scattered among many government agencies, ultimate responsibility for international work in culture, like other aspects of U.S. foreign policy, rests with the White House. In the aftermath of 9/11, the Bush administration has moved beyond the White House's traditional oversight role to actually create several White House initiatives specifically designed to coordinate and plan a U.S. international communications strategy, an effort that encompasses goals and tactics generally associated with public or cultural diplomacy. A Strategic Communications Policy Coordinating Committee was established in 2002 and asked to draft a national communication strategy, but it disbanded in 2003 without completing its assignment. In 2003, a White House Office of Global Communications was founded and also directed to draft a strategy. It, too, was disbanded – embarrassingly, just before a Congressional report called on the Administration to make better use of the new office.
Muslim World Outreach Policy Coordinating Committee followed in July 2004, operating within the narrower mandate its title implies.

Other inter-agency bodies attempt to coordinate public diplomacy activities across the U.S. government, a process typified by weekly or quarterly meetings gathering the 12 of the multiple federal departments and 15 of the independent agencies involved in international exchanges or training initiatives.  

At the State Department

Most of the bureaucracy of America's public and cultural diplomacy is now housed within the State Department, overseen by the Under Secretary of State for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs. The post has been something of a revolving door and to date has been vacant for over a year. In the months following the 9/11 attacks, advertising executive Charlotte Beers was recruited to develop an effective global message. She resigned, citing health problems, in the wake of criticism of a Middle East TV ad campaign featuring Arab-Americans. Her successor, State Department veteran Margaret Tutwiler, occupied the Under Secretary job for only a few months. The post's next occupant, Karen Hughes – longtime adviser to President George W. Bush – is expecting Senate confirmation as this report is in press, the fall of 2005.

The Under Secretary supervises three sub-units, of which two are directly relevant to cultural affairs. The Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs implements the bulk of public/cultural programming, including exchanges, scholarship and training programs, English instruction, cultural programming, and cultural preservation.

Despite post-Cold War movement away from culture and the difficulty in acquiring and retaining solid leadership at the Under Secretary level, a wide array of cultural exchange activities continue, though many appear to be targets of opportunity involving artists and performers who have worked with the U.S. abroad in the past, or who contact the department themselves to add a diplomatic component to touring plans already in place. Today the flagship cultural program at the Bureau is “Culture Connect,” which sends 13 cultural ambassadors it describes as “prominent artists and intellectuals” (ranging from classical musicians Denyce Graves and Yo-Yo Ma to basketball star Tracy McGrady) to work with youth audiences in other countries, while simultaneously bringing small numbers of young people to the U.S. The Bureau also supports cultural preservation abroad through its Ambassador’s Fund for Cultural Preservation, first created by Congress for
2001 and funded to allow $1 million in awards in 2003. Although tiny, the Bureau’s preservation program has been hailed as an innovative, concrete demonstration of U.S. concern for the well-being of historic sites and local culture around the world.

A second departmental division, the Office of International Information Programs, administers an international speakers program and maintains newsfeeds and a website for international users. The physical outposts of U.S. cultural and public diplomacy are arrayed under several different rubrics, some falling outside the direct supervision of the Under Secretary. Most American Libraries and American Centers – the classic venues for research, readings, and English classes – have been closed or will soon close for security reasons. In their place, the government has developed a variety of resources that attempt to maintain the function of the library program while limiting security risks by minimizing or eliminating face-to-face contact with U.S. facilities or embassy and consulate staff; each communication system is managed by a different State Department entity.

More than 140 foreign-service posts still offer Information Resource Centers, with cultural library facilities and CD-ROMs, some with Internet access – but today many are available for limited hours, to restricted, pre-screened audiences, or only by appointment.

American Centers and American Corners, library-like centers staffed by non-Americans and located in foreign universities, business centers, and other non-U.S. properties (the first one in Afghanistan was inside the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ Institute of Diplomacy) are growing rapidly – in mid-2004, the State Department had opened 143 with plans for another 130.

Virtual Presence Posts are websites – Internet-based resource centers targeted at citizens of a particular country. As of mid-2005, more than 20 such websites have been set up, serving vast regions or cities where the U.S. has closed or cannot open consulates. They offer a range of basic information about the U.S., government contacts, and announcements for upcoming cultural events.

In 2004, Congress created the Office of Policy, Planning and Resources, intended to provide strategic planning, coordination and evaluation for U.S. public diplomacy worldwide. As of May 2005, this office has not yet released its first strategic products, though it has created a council to evaluate public diplomacy initiatives currently underway.
The Broadcasting Board of Governors

The broadcasting elements of official U.S. public diplomacy are independently housed and supervised by the Broadcasting Board of Governors (BBG) – a part-time, bipartisan group. In addition to its funding role, the BBG has been understood to be a buffer separating policy influences and the journalistic integrity of broadcasters, professionals who believe strongly in their role as independent media voices rather than as hired communicators of U.S. policy. Today, U.S. government broadcasting includes Voice of America, a global service; Worldnet Television; Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; Radio Free Asia; Radio and TV Marti, broadcasting in Spanish to Cuba; and the newest service, Middle East Radio Network (MERN), created in 2002 and better known as Radio Sawa; and a satellite television station, al-Hurra. Together these services broadcast in 65 languages and reach about 100 million people weekly. These broadcasting services consume approximately half of the annual U.S. public diplomacy budget. Recent innovations have included developing radio and TV services (such as Radio Sawa and a similar effort targeted at Iran) designed to address youth and mass audiences rather than the elite listeners traditionally targeted by the Voice of America.

Private-Sector Partnerships

From its earliest days, a tradition of public-private partnership has been important to America’s cultural and exchange programming. In fact, some U.S. government exchange programming gets as much as half its funding from outside sources, and non-governmental organizations manage such major programs as the Fulbright and other scholarships/fellowships. In addition, corporations in the U.S. and overseas underwrite tours of artists, musicians, and other cultural figures.

Innovative post-9/11 programming has attracted interesting and broad new partnerships, particularly important since, for security reasons, much of this programming must occur outside of U.S. Embassy facilities. The program of American Centers and Corners in Russia, for example, boasts an extensive and creative lineup of non-governmental partners, from Baskin Robbins Ice Cream to U.S. university libraries and exchange organizations to New York City Pizza of Novosibirsk, Russia. Around the world, these American Centers and Corners are found in schools and universities, trade centers, government facilities, and even pizza shops.
Although much of this partnering has been one-time and ad hoc, results can be impressive. After State Department and Kennedy Center officials arranged a U.S. tour for the Iraqi National Orchestra in late 2003, for example, Steinway and Yamaha stepped in to donate new instruments.\(^3\)

Quite possibly some of the most interesting public-private partnerships occur entirely outside the scope of the State Department’s public diplomacy bureaucracy. The U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), for example, has supported Sesame Workshop’s creation of Sesame Street spin-offs in South Africa, Egypt, India, and Bangladesh.

**What Is the Nature of the Current Problem?**

In recent years, international public opinion polls have emerged as the widely accepted yardstick determining the success of U.S. public and cultural diplomacy. By their measure, our public diplomacy efforts since 9/11 are failing. The 9/11 Commission and numerous quasi-governmental and private commissions investigating U.S. public diplomacy have identified the same broad set of problems:

- **Collapses in the scope of programs and funding since end of the Cold War.** USAID scholarships for foreign students to U.S. institutions, for example, declined from 20,000 in 1980 to just 900 in recent years.\(^4\)
- Funding for educational and cultural exchange fell more than one-third in inflation-adjusted dollars between 1993 and 2001, from $349 million to $232 million.\(^5\)
- Academic and cultural exchanges declined from 45,000 in 1995 to 29,000 in 2001.\(^6\)
- Total funding for the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs amounts to just $3 million.\(^7\)
- Congress and the White House have begun to address the funding shortfall, increasing the total funding available for public diplomacy to $1.5 billion in 2005, its highest level ever. However, rebuilding such programs with qualified staff – or building effective new ones – takes time.

Efforts lack relevant expertise and focus. It has been widely and repeatedly noted that U.S. outreach efforts, and the national security apparatus more generally, are woefully lacking in speakers of Arabic and other difficult languages, as well as experts possessing appropriate cultural background and expertise. For example, as recently as early 2005, the State Department’s primary Islamic outreach program had no Muslim staff.\(^8\)

In contrast, Cold War-era programming was enriched by the presence émigré professionals from the very countries we were most trying to influence. While European émigrés such as Henry Kissinger, Zbigniew
Brzezinski, and Madeleine Albright attained some of the highest positions in U.S. national security structures, the most senior Muslim Americans in government today are Ambassador to Iraq Zalmay Khalilzad and director of the National Institutes of Health Elias Zerhouni.  

Alumni of Cold War–era public diplomacy complain that the outreach function receives short shrift within the State Department, that ambassadors and spokespersons are insufficiently trained, that cultural attaché positions are viewed as career backwaters, and that too few people with relevant private-sector expertise are being brought into government. In what has become a recurring theme, much has been written about the lack of coordination among and within agencies, and the lack of an overall strategy for U.S. public diplomacy.

Efforts are simply ineffective. Voice of America listenership in Middle East countries is said to average only about 2 percent of the population. Heated debate continues to question the effectiveness of Radio Sawa, al-Hurra TV, and similar ventures. While their defenders claim audience penetration as high as 29 percent for al-Hurra and higher numbers for Radio Sawa in some countries, critics argue that BBG surveys are skewed. Crafted in the aftermath of 9/11, a series of Madison Avenue-style infomercials about the lives American Muslims lead was immediately widely ridiculed; more significantly, the spots found few Arab stations willing to run them. And, while it is impossible to reconcile debates about audience numbers and survey methods, it is worth reiterating that public opinion polls show neither any overall increase in positive Arab views of the U.S., nor even any indication that listeners to U.S.-sponsored program services hold views more positive than non-listeners.

The Special Challenges Facing Cultural Initiatives

The cultural element within public diplomacy faces particular challenges. While extensive lip service is still paid to the role of culture in international affairs, the reality is that cultural policy has fallen out of fashion.

The numerous reports on public diplomacy and how to fix it that have been produced since the 9/11 attacks mention culture perhaps a dozen times among them, and then usually in reference to the Bureau of Educational and Cultural Affairs. Although the 9/11 Report itself asserts the importance of culture, that assessment is buried at the back of the document, deep within Chapter 12 (“What to Do? A Global Strategy”). There is, perhaps, discomfort with proposing culture as a solution to a problem that seems, at first glance at least, to stem primarily from cultural
difference and cultural conflict. In addition, and more significantly, cultural programming requires time and assumes a depth of dialogue that extends beyond press releases, TV infomercials, and websites. Any results are unlikely to surface as positive responses in focus groups or surveys for a long time.

Today there is more talk of “culture” in international affairs than at any time since the end of the Cold War. However, paradoxically, the newly elevated profile of cultural differences and cultural hostility has increased, rather than reduced, the demand for instantaneous results. Against a background of global-attitude polls that appear every few days, weeks or months, programs intended to transform public opinion that require a number of years to play out lack political oxygen. As long as U.S. cultural diplomacy is conceived narrowly as comprising touring artists, professorial exchanges, and English lessons, it will be crippled by its time horizons in a pressed-for-results policy environment.

Then, too, much of U.S. public diplomacy operates on the assumption that a one-way conversation is sufficient, and that a simple exposition of facts, as we see them, will set everything right in the world’s view of America. It has been suggested that the most effective aspect of U.S. exchange programming over the years has been our enthusiasm for encouraging foreigners to visit for long periods of time in order to see for themselves how the U.S. works, how diversity of opinion is managed and even encouraged, how diversity and depth of culture produce a richness that is not always visible from overseas. Cultural insight of this nature is difficult to present on a website; it is even more difficult to sustain when visas are ever more expensive and when security concerns make travel documents ever harder to come by.

**Mutuality**

Although not yet a component of the U.S. cultural policy conversation, the notion of “mutuality” – long-term relationships among nations based on trust – has emerged in Europe and the UK. Mutuality seeks to go beyond the standard short-term strategy of diplomatic exchange, which is usually transactional: I do x and you give me y in return. Transactional relationships don’t require much trust, but also exhibit only limited staying power. If a flight attendant tells me the airplane is going to Houston, I’ll believe him, but I won’t, as a result of that belief, agree to loan him money. Transactions, even satisfying ones, don’t necessarily produce trust. In contrast, mutuality does not demand a transactional, quid pro quo outcome, but instead seeks the kind of
unstated trust that individuals place in friends and families. Following World War II, and even at the end of the Cold War, the U.S., as a powerful but unthreatening power, possessed and benefited from the global presence of substantial reserves of non-specific trust. The increase in negative sentiment toward the U.S. tracks the erosion of non-specific trust, rather than the failure of one or more diplomatic or foreign aid transactions. As such, it reflects a widely perceived lack of mutuality between the U.S. and other nations.

The doctrine of mutuality also critiques the fact that much of historical intercultural communication has been designed to flow in one direction. For example, in many ways, much of the U.S. government’s broadcast-focused, PR approach to the international community can be characterized as: I’ll tell you my story and, according to the volume and virtuosity of my narrative, I’ll convince you that I am correct. In contrast, mutuality is about listening, as much as talking, and about using trust to support, as much as is possible, two-way communication.

However, mutuality is not an easy sell. Governments tend to like transactional relationships best, because they have short-term goals and are easier to track. Nothing has emerged in the years since the 9/11 attacks to suggest that the U.S. has magically developed the patience required to work slowly toward trust relationships with critics and potential adversaries around the world. In other words, there appears to be no recognition of the need for mutuality. However, despite its slightly New-Age sheen, the idea of bundling America’s expressive life as part of a long-term, back-and-forth exchange with the outside world may emerge from the wings as the most effective approach to replenishing global reservoirs of non-specific trust. Given the long-term goals of corporations and trade negotiators working in international settings, mutuality may be most easily pursued outside the official public diplomacy programming managed by the Departments of State and Defense. Ultimately, a variation of mutuality adapted to the U.S. situation may serve as the best umbrella policy for cultural diplomacy work.

V. Culture for Export: The Private Sector

*Government agencies have a strategic edge with regards to knowledge of foreign policy objectives, in-depth intelligence on regional and local conditions, and a worldwide network of broadcast resources and public*
affairs officers. The private sector enjoys an advantage when it comes to marketing and public relations skills, perceived independence and credibility, and resources.

— GAO

Introduction

Far more U.S. culture is now transmitted to remote places around the globe by the private sector than by official public diplomacy efforts. Even as government investment in the movement of culture around the world has declined, the technology of globalization has triggered an explosion in U.S. cultural exports.

As has been noted, the marketing of U.S. culture – the high culture of ideas as well as pop culture – is sometimes fueling distaste for the U.S. rather than contributing to mutual understanding. The rise of U.S. cultural trade has made cultural exporters a significant interest for U.S. trade policy – generating a new point of cross-cultural contact that on its own has the potential to create more friction that cultural exchange is able to reduce.

Cultural Penetration

The dramatic growth in the reach of American culture and the importance of trade in cultural products has come about largely because technological advancements have made it easier to disseminate cultural products, either for sale or, in the case of broadcasting and new Internet-based technologies, for free. Digitization allows video, voice, and data to stream anywhere in the world where a phone line can be strung, and TV already travels directly from satellites to homes around the world. As hardware, software, and networks are growing in sophistication, technology is both proliferating and dropping in price, making increasing numbers of cell phones, traditional phones, computers, television sets, and personal video recorders available worldwide, enabling more people in more places extract new content from the ether.

It is worth remembering that America’s cultural diplomacy was conceptualized, and its core institutions and relationships created, at a time when there were no broadcast satellites, video recorders, personal computers, or Internet; when newsreel footage had to be flown back to the U.S. to be broadcast; when much of the world lacked any access to television or telephone lines — an era, in fact, when governments could rightly claim to be the primary global purveyor of cultural content.
Today, radios, televisions, and Internet cafes have sprouted in even the poorest and most remote areas. The Internet is awash in content. Movies, TV shows, and music are all available for download, paid or unpaid. For the cost of a satellite dish, citizens in many parts of the world have access to a broad array of channels, many of which will either be American or be presenting American products.

These developments have two consequences. First, millions of people around the world are encountering vast quantities of American culture. These encounters are unmediated — no discussion over coffee at the American Center after the movie, no officials in Washington determining which books, films, or serials might be most appropriate for a targeted audience. Today, the market decides — and, as might be expected, the market mechanism possesses no greater capacity to advance elevated content across borders than it has within the U.S.

To quote one close observer: “Satellite broadcasting has changed the international media landscape. Satellite technology now allows broadcasters to instantly reach audiences all over the globe even in areas that lack terrestrial broadcast infrastructures. Satellite broadcasting has seen exponential growth in the Middle East. Nilesat, the most popular satellite distributor in the Middle East, doubled its household reach from 2003 to 2004.”

Second, the democratization of access to technologies guarantees that U.S. culture now has competition. Almost anybody can put up a web page or otherwise register his or her cultural critique. Sometimes it seems as if almost everybody does, and the U.S. no longer can view itself as the world’s dominant communicator. According to one estimate, only 9 of the world’s 20 most-visited web sites are U.S.-based, with China, South Korea, Japan, and the UK rounding out the list. Google, the number-three site, estimates that 50 percent of its traffic comes from outside the U.S.

On TV screens in the Middle East, al-Jazeera and al-Arabiya television slug it out with each other, as well as with CNN and other news outlets. Except in a few remote places, U.S.-funded communications no longer represent a consumer’s only alternative to his or her official government media and cultural programming. The U.S. government can expect, therefore, that any official assertions advanced in a public diplomacy setting will be challenged vigorously – by its own private-sector culture as well as by programming produced by others.
Cultural Trade

Culture is big business. Worldwide, cultural goods represented 2.8 percent of all imports in 1997, the latest year for which UNESCO has statistics. The value of cultural imports rose fivefold between 1980 and 1998. Music goods represent one-quarter of that total; sound recordings and equipment for sound recordings, another 15 percent.

Cultural industries, and cultural exports in particular, are important and growing parts of the U.S. economy. As U.S. production of manufactured goods drops, service industries are growing rapidly, keeping the trade deficit from being even larger. Some experts believe that service-sector surpluses could eventually reverse the trade deficit.

Broadcasting, entertainment, and publishing exports earned $10.1 billion in 2000–2001, according to the U.S. Department of Commerce. That is just under 4 percent of total U.S. trade in services – but cultural exports are booming in several sectors.

Since 1996, the U.S. has led the world in exports of printed material. U.S. industry not only leads but accounts for one-third of the total of the $40 billion global music market, according to the Recording Industry Association of America. Foreign box-office receipts for American films, up 24 percent just since 2000, now exceed domestic receipts. Along with DVD sales, international box-office revenue is critically important to the industry, since only 4 of 10 films ever recoup their production costs, and only 1 in 10 gets into the black through domestic box-office alone.

The film industry trade association, the Motion Picture Association of America, is well aware of the importance of export. MPAA’s president and CEO, Dan Glickman, asserts that “alone among all sectors of the U.S. economy, our industry is the only one that generates a positive balance of trade in every country in which it does business.” He has also noted that “the movie industry’s share of the American economy is growing – faster than the rest of the economy.”

Technological developments – the availability of movies, TV, and radio over the Internet, the spread of personal video recorders, and other devices – have greatly expanded the potential for trade in cultural products. These technologies have also made digital duplication easy, dramatically increasing the likelihood that cultural products will be sold or distributed without payment of the various royalties due their owners or creators. This development has made some concerns about trade policy more urgent for U.S. exporters, even as it threatens to make other long-standing issues simply irrelevant.
Trade Policy

As cultural products have grown in importance for U.S. exports, their representatives have worked diligently with Congress and the Executive Branch to protect those aspects of U.S. trade policy that favor their exports.

For much of the last 30 years, however, indigenous cultural industries – especially film and television – in key U.S. export markets have determined that they are fighting for their lives in a rising tide of imported U.S. product. Coupled with broader public concerns in many countries that U.S. imports, or modern popular culture in general (often symbolized by the demon of U.S. imports) is displacing heritage or national cultural traditions, trade policy has been defined, by nations like Canada, France and Australia, as a politically volatile cultural issue.

Within the U.S., however, trade policy for cultural products has not been framed in cultural terms, but rather as free-trade ideology justifying the unfettered pursuit of U.S. economic interests. Apart from the occasional non-governmental symposium, there exists little evidence that cultural trade and the angst it generates abroad have ever been considered as aspects of U.S. public and cultural diplomacy. Indeed, the issue is usually absent from even lists of those U.S. policies that stir up international hostility toward the U.S. And the situation is unlikely to change. Because U.S. cultural industries consistently generate positive trade balances with importing countries, they possess the domestic political clout required to keep their economic interests out of the fraught arena of cultural conflict.

U.S. trade policy priorities in the cultural sphere can be broken down into two components. First, the U.S. emphasizes very strong worldwide protections for U.S. intellectual property rights, especially copyright, intended to prevent piracy and theft. (According to the Motion Picture Association of America, piracy and theft cost the U.S. film industry alone more than $3 billion a year.) Intense U.S. pressure around the globe aimed at securing copyright and trademark-protected revenue streams for U.S. entertainment companies has at times fueled enormous resentment, a resentment directed toward trade policy and not at cultural policy per se. However, as entertainment industries extend the term and reach of copyright, new questions loom for upper-echelon international and domestic policymakers as they are forced to maintain a balance between securing protected revenue streams on the one hand while, on the other, encouraging the widest dissemination of ideas and creative expression to advance a diplomatic agenda. An additional question that looms in the
background – U.S. responsibility to protect global creative heritage and respect the aspirations of cultural industries in other nations – has not, to date, surfaced as either a U.S. cultural- or trade-policy issue.

Second, in addition to intellectual property protection, U.S. trade policy in cultural products focuses on maintaining the freest possible trade environment. From the early 1990s forward, the World Trade Organization and other arenas of negotiation have witnessed continuous pressure to incorporate what is known as the “cultural exception” – special rules that permit governments to impose quotas on what percentage of screen time may be allocated to foreign (meaning U.S.) films. At the same time, the cultural exceptions permit subsidies for goods deemed for government use, such as productions for government-owned theaters, etc. However, during the same period, some countries moved away from protectionist limits on U.S. content in favor of subsidies designed to build up domestic cultural industries – and in some instances, those subsidies have been successful.

Meanwhile, the same technologies discussed above make it easier to produce and distribute high-quality film and TV anywhere, making it easier to create and distribute local culture on the one hand, and harder to create and enforce content restrictions on the other. After all, when standard broadcast TV channels are supplemented by direct-to-satellite channels beamed in from outside the country, or by web-based TV, domestic content quotas are difficult or impossible to enforce.

Efforts to open trade further across the board (the “Doha Round” – i.e., the fourth WTO Ministerial meeting, held in Doha, Qatar, in 2001) slowed in 2003. At those talks, U.S. cultural industries – specifically the MPAA – had hoped to end the use of quotas. France, Canada, and their allies proposed that negotiations on cultural matters no longer continue through the World Trade Organization. Instead, UNESCO would negotiate a global convention on cultural diversity that would create permanent protections for cultural industries. Sensitive to the elevated character of cultural trade issues brought about by UNESCO work on cultural diversity, U.S. negotiators have not pressed for a rollback of existing national content restrictions, arguing instead for a “standstill” commitment to present levels of openness.

But by the time Doha stumbled – and more dramatically since that time – developments in technology have continued to reconfigure the playing field. With more and more cultural products traded in digital form, U.S. industry has been taking full advantage of the existence of a temporary WTO moratorium on duties on digitally traded goods. U.S.
policy shifted, focusing specifically on “the free trade of so-called digital products like music, software or movies that derive their value from ‘content produced’ by the information technology (IT) or entertainment industries, and that were previously – in the offline world – delivered by physical carrier media such as CDs.” With the progress slowed in talks over multiple issues, including intellectual property, the U.S. has had little opportunity to advance this position.

Meanwhile, however, the U.S. has aggressively pursued bilateral trade agreements that codify its digital trade and intellectual property protection goals. Enacted or pending free-trade agreements with Singapore, Chile, Central American nations (CAFTA), and others all include the results of U.S. efforts to secure maximalist positions in these issues. Again, it has been U.S. negotiations on intellectual property rights that have attracted comment and complaint that bleeds into the realm of cultural diplomacy. Criticisms have noted the U.S. ability to force distasteful provisions on smaller states against their own best interests – a position that can be interpreted as the antithesis of what cultural exchange and diplomacy are trying to accomplish.

**Missed Opportunities: The Significant Role of the USTR**

The official U.S. cultural diplomacy portfolio resides within the State Department. However, the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR), in its role as the trade advocate for America’s cultural (and other) industries, has emerged as a critical point of contact between American art and artists and cultural policies and public perception in other nations. The USTR can trace its origins to the early 1960s, when a group of legislators employed the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 to secure the appointment of a representative for trade negotiations within the Kennedy administration. President John Kennedy’s Executive Order 11075 created a Special Representative for Trade. By 1974, the position had acquired permanent status as part of the executive branch. In 1980, President Jimmy Carter increased the number of employees attached to the Office and approved the name change to United States Trade Representative. It is the USTR that represents U.S. interests in bilateral negotiations and in the development of multi-national agreements like NAFTA and CAFTA, and it is the USTR that expands markets and protects revenue streams on behalf of U.S. cultural industries.

In its role as trade advocate, the USTR has quietly evolved as the most influential actor in the movement of U.S. culture around the world. However, the USTR mandate does not extend beyond trade to
incorporate cultural impact in its work. In most negotiations, U.S. representatives sit across the table from ministers of culture or their designees. Cultural ministries, or departments of cultural affairs, manage portfolios that enable them to simultaneously pursue trade and cultural diplomacy objectives. Countries like France and Canada took full advantage of USTR’s limited portfolio by transferring their pursuit of protectionist “cultural content” carve-outs away from trade talks into UNESCO discussions of cultural diversity, thereby accomplishing an end run around forums dedicated to trade negotiation as well as the U.S. trade agenda.

By the same token, sometimes bullying USTR tactics aimed at rolling back local content regulations enacted by U.S. trade partners hold the very real possibility of counteracting positive State Department diplomatic initiatives. At the same time, USTR sometimes encourages partnerships that can grow indigenous arts industries in other countries. Because the Office of the USTR is the most important government actor in relation to the output of U.S. entertainment industries, the agency holds the potential for shading trade policy to help produce positive diplomatic outcomes. However, the lack of congruency between State Department and USTR tactics and objectives resulting from the absence of central authority and coordination in U.S. cultural affairs currently makes bad results more likely. To date, however, neither cultural diplomacy nor trade actors have come to grips with the ways an absence of coordination has generated unanticipated effects, producing both costly failures and missed opportunities.

VI. Private Practitioners of Public Diplomacy

*With its enormous reach and resourcefulness, American business is uniquely qualified to address many root causes of anti-Americanism.*

— from the homepage of Business for Diplomatic Action

In global affairs, one of the signal changes of the past 20 years has been the emergence of non-governmental organizations as important actors alongside governments and international organizations. They can be instrumental in creating international law (an NGO coalition won the Nobel Peace Prize for its leadership in bringing about the UN’s ban on landmines); in ending conflicts (the Catholic Sant’Egidio community has played a critical mediating role in Mozambique and Guatemala); and in
humanitarian action (the government of Botswana is providing AIDS drugs to its citizens through a partnership with the pharmaceutical giant Merck and the Gates Foundation). It should come as no surprise that not-for-profits have sprung up to fill perceived gaps in American public and cultural diplomacy, or that some American businesses have decided explicitly to conduct public diplomacy on their own in the name of the U.S.

As in the earliest days of American cultural diplomacy, the routine traffic of personnel shuttling among government jobs, business, and big-name not-for-profits continues to ensure a certain degree of consensus on aims. It is no longer the case, however, that such individuals will also be members of, or closely connected to, the American cultural establishment. Thus, the cultural sector is not necessarily “at the table” when private-sector public diplomacy is considered or undertaken. Business, NGO, and foundation sectors, grappling with many of the same pressures as the government to produce quantifiable results in a short time frame, often simply do not have the luxury of working with the cultural sector.

Meanwhile, the arts in America must increasingly operate on a commercial basis and have always flourished in relative anarchy, without government support or oversight. Artists can, and do, pick up and travel anywhere in the world for inspiration and/or remuneration. They have little incentive to go looking for non-existent government or private-sector support to globalize themselves. In addition, although not-for-profit arts organizations such as orchestras and art museums have been among the most vocal supporters of cultural exchange, they are content to carry on the old school, cosmopolitan, high-art cultural diplomacy agenda that defined cultural diplomacy in its earliest days. However, the elite-to-elite communication implied by black-tie embassy receptions, classical music tours, and art openings seems an ineffectual tool for policy leaders attempting to counteract radical Islam.

**Business**

The private sector has been quick to define cultural diplomacy as promoting or protecting “brand equity.” Although a range of international public-opinion surveys has produced little evidence of erosion in “Brand USA” triggered by current business practices, corporate America has felt sufficiently threatened by speculation about boycotts and consumer hostility to take on this as a potential problem to be reckoned
with. Richard Edelman, CEO of public relations heavyweight Edelman U.S.A., characterizes companies that depend on brand recognition – companies that foreign consumers have been encouraged for years to identify with America – as those at greatest risk:

A profound trust gap exists for American corporations in Europe… It is brand players who are particularly affected by this trend, while technology companies seem to be immune, as they are perceived to be more global.72

Business has engaged different levels of international work. Groups such as the Transatlantic Business Dialogue (TABD), founded to create a private-sector counterpart to the United States–European Union relationship, have felt free to take positions on public diplomacy issues. These groups, in the words of TABD’s U.S. executive director Jeffrey Werner, are “not looking to replace what the government does – the state does diplomacy – we are just looking to provide industry input [where damaged political relations might affect industry].”73

Recently, however, corporate involvement is moving beyond advisory collaboration, toward do-it-yourself public diplomacy.74 Harvard Business School professor John Quelch argues that the best-run American multinationals independently addressed their problems years ago by downplaying their U.S. cultural ties, displaying greater sensitivity to local culture, and upgrading local community involvement.

Today, however, in the wake of 9/11 and the resulting increased U.S. focus within on public diplomacy, some in the business community are taking an even more hands-on approach. Business for Diplomatic Action brings together a task force of high-level communications, marketing, media, and research leaders with the explicit goal of addressing the rise in anti-American sentiment. BDA’s action plan is centered in teaching the concept of global citizenship to corporations and individuals. The group has also proposed that corporations come together to fund large-scale exchange programs through internships. It has argued strongly that the U.S. government is “not a credible messenger” in the Middle East, but that, in a hostile environment, American business can and should take the lead.75

Business activities like these focus strongly on culture as a backdrop for public diplomacy, and on encouraging Americans to better value and respect the culture of others. But they have not advocated the widespread
dissemination of U.S. culture as part of the solution – except to the extent that culture may be defined as a collection of products or brands.

**NGOs**

Today not-for-profit organizations, too, are stepping more directly into public and cultural diplomacy. A few examples demonstrate the variety of these not-for-profit programs:

**Promoting the Cause of Public Diplomacy**: Organizations of USIA alumni, academic institutions, special commissions, and institutes have come into existence to promote and improve U.S. public diplomacy. These entities provide a steady stream of coverage of public diplomacy issues as well as papers, op-eds, and interviews critiquing what is being done and offering proposals on how it could be done better.

George Mason University hosts the Center for Arts and Culture, and George Washington University hosts the Public Diplomacy Institute and the Public Diplomacy Council – all offering a varying range of coursework, seminars and policy papers, expertise and advocacy around public and cultural diplomacy. USIA’s alumni organization and USC’s Center on Public Diplomacy sponsor web resources for news and commentary. Since 2001, the Council on Foreign Relations has sponsored task forces on several aspects of public diplomacy. The U.S. Public Diplomacy Advisory Council, affiliated with the State Department, produces an annual report. Canadian, European, and UK groups also exist, some focused specifically on the connections between trade and cultural policy that were discussed in Section V of this report.

Many U.S. not-for-profits have taken on activities that might have been left to USIA in its pre–State Department incarnation. Debt AIDS Trade Africa (DATA) has sent rock stars, athletes, and actors to Africa to dramatize and build support for a response to the AIDS epidemic.

In service to American citizens, at least one new not-for-profit organization has been formed with the explicit aim “to inform and educate the American people about international affairs and facilitate cross-cultural discussion about international issues and America’s role in the world.” America Abroad Media was created after 9/11, drawing expertise and sponsorship from the foreign affairs, media, and foundation communities, producing radio and TV programming for U.S. audiences and sponsoring student-to-student videoconferencing and televised discussions aimed at breaking down cultural barriers.

Not-for-profit public diplomacy is an imperfect substitute for government work, for it often aggressively promotes an NGO’s own
idiosyncratic vision of American culture and American values, a vision sometimes at odds with the policy goals of a given presidential administration. Such a divergence, of course, is one of the glories of America’s entrepreneurial, free-speech culture – but it does make the task of developing a coherent and consistent U.S. cultural diplomatic policy yet more challenging.

Foundations

Whereas large philanthropic foundations active in foreign affairs were central to American efforts in cultural diplomacy half a century ago, today few foundations engage in cultural diplomacy activities. The proportion of funding dedicated to international cultural activities is also minuscule – by one study’s count, it amounts to just one-fifth of 1 percent of the giving of 49 major foundations.78 Much of the infrastructure for international cultural exchange that exists in the foundation world has been vulnerable to elimination in favor of newer priorities, or to general belt-tightening in the years following the stock market downturn of 2001.

As public and cultural diplomacy become priorities again, however, the prospects for broader involvement by foundations may be on the upswing. America Abroad Media, for example (mentioned in the previous section on NGOs), receives grants from several of the major foundation players.

Moreover, some grant-making foundations have been acting more like NGOs by developing and managing their own program activity, some of it in the cultural diplomacy arena. The UN Foundation, for example, has mounted programs designed to bring Arab journalists to the United Nations, American journalists to the United Nations, American editorial writers to Cambodia and India, while sending women from developing nations across the US on tours to raise AIDS awareness.79 In another prominent example, the Rockefeller Brothers Fund operates a high-level civilian-to-civilian dialogue with Iran.

Like observers in government and American industry, many foundations that are long-time funders of international not-for-profits have viewed with concern the decline of America’s image in the world and the decline of support for a collaborative vision of American foreign policy. Although their responses do not yet include a strong cultural component, the opportunity is certainly present right now.
VII. Culture and the National Interest: Key Questions for the Future

So the real issue here isn't really so much public diplomacy, seen as selling America, but finding a way where public diplomacy can help shape policy. And I think there are ways in which public diplomacy could be extremely helpful in the shaping of policy: Number one, communicating America’s message in a way that is trusted by the rest of the world. The collapse of trust today is the more profoundly important issue than just the unfavorable view of the U.S. You need a trusted message. When you ask people "Do you trust America today," the vast majority don't believe what we say. They don't believe we're advocating democracy…

I think what we must understand is one of the functions of this office, aside from input into policy, is building bridges over time, in the long term. It's not just for the short term. What you want to do is you want to build relations with society that are the reservoir of support in times of crisis. You know you're going to go through crisis with any country around the world. You're going to have confrontation, but you need to be able to sustain that, to sustain yourself through that, and to build that across time is really the important mission for any public diplomacy program to be effective.

— Shibley Telhami

The basic challenge today is how to shift the debate from foreign policy to civil society [based] on the American idea.

— Fawaz Gerges

This report has drawn extensively from the burgeoning literature on how to “fix” U.S. cultural and public diplomacy. Ironically, a casual review of analytical trends reveals that, for the most part, culture is seen as (or assumed to be) part of the problem, not the solution. This view suggests we might address current diplomatic challenges by limiting the flow or even editing the content of American art and entertainment products. While it is unquestionably true that a portion of America’s cultural output contributes to negative views of the U.S., culture is also uniquely capable of conveying our finest dreams and values. If we revisit global challenges from a framework of positive assumptions regarding the impact of culture, a different set of questions and prescriptions emerge. This concluding section of our report summarizes the challenges inherent in
engaging culture as a component of U.S. global policy and suggests a number of actions that can enable policy leaders to make the best possible use of our nation’s creative assets.

As we have seen, U.S. cultural diplomacy has weakened considerably since its heyday during the Cold War: its pieces are scattered, its role is de-prioritized, and its potential as the centerpiece of a real American re-engagement in dialogue with the rest of the world is misunderstood. Because “culture,” in general, exists in a policy vacuum within the U.S. system, any program of cultural diplomacy or exchange must overcome a number of unique obstacles.

The portfolio is divided up among many policy actors. The U.S. State Department, Broadcasting Board of Governors, and Office of the U.S. Trade Representative each implement programming that conveys American culture to the world. In addition, the Department of Defense, the Central Intelligence Agency, and the White House manage programs that use art, culture, and scholarly research (sometimes clandestinely or unintentionally) to advance a perceived diplomatic or strategic purpose. Furthermore, designated cultural agencies such as the Library of Congress, Smithsonian Institution, and Arts and Humanities Endowments manage international exchange programs, and some U.S. states and regional arts agencies manage international projects independent of federal authority. While a number of government agencies are recognized for their efforts at promoting culture or arts products around the world, many carry out cultural work without a specific mandate. For example, the little-known U.S.-China Economic & Security Review Commission claims the enforcement of U.S. intellectual property laws in China as a major initiative, a goal with significant cultural consequences. Also, a number of NGOs partner with or fund programming designed and implemented by this multitude of federal, state, and regional agencies. Because so many agencies and NGOs own pieces of the cultural diplomacy pie in the U.S., currently it is virtually impossible to implement a coordinated international cultural program from the top down. In fact, a number of agency programs may actually work at cross purposes, as is the case, for example, when the promotion of American movies abroad may stir resentments that the Voice of America or State Department can be simultaneously attempting to counteract, or when security concerns delay the issuance of visas to scholars or artists.

Can an informal consortium of multiple U.S. cultural policy actors, or a single agency or department, assert leadership sufficient to iron out
conflicting international agendas while implementing and maintaining a coherent and compatible set of diplomatic, exchange, and trade policies?

The marketplace rules. Media technology and the development of global business models implemented since World War II ensure that any public investment in cultural diplomacy or exchange will be dwarfed by the export of movies, TV programs, and music by America's entertainment industries. However, with the exception of (generally pro-business) copyright law and federal regulation of the airwaves through our FCC, there exists almost no set of laws or regulations that can be marshaled to ensure that America's entertainment industries conform to U.S. public diplomacy objectives in the export of movies, TV programs, and music. Further, First Amendment protection makes it likely that any new laws and regulations influencing the content of media would be judged unconstitutional.

In recent years, a combination of inexpensive direct-to-satellite distribution and a savvy international business model has enabled the long-running “bathing beauties” showcase Baywatch to maintain a position as the most popular U.S. TV series among non-elite populations in the Middle East. Such dominance marks American popular entertainment as the preeminent vehicle for conveying to foreign audiences what appear to be American heritage and values; such dominance also makes it difficult for government-funded media to compete and convey content that is aligned with diplomatic purposes. If the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative is on the policy point to ensure the greatest movement of U.S. culture abroad via trade, should the USTR take on a diplomatic and exchange agenda?

Given a U.S. political environment that honors both marketplace independence and First Amendment rights, can our policy leaders find ways to shape significant portions of the vast global output of U.S. entertainment industries to address policy objectives?

Absent a policy hub, new initiatives in cultural diplomacy are hard to launch. In a nation that lacks a Department of Cultural Affairs, any new program of cultural exchange or cultural diplomacy emerges unprotected into a maze of competing agencies and initiatives. Over more than three and one-half years since the attacks of 9/11, the White House has begun two different cultural/public affairs initiatives, each coming on the scene accompanied by considerable fanfare; neither has advanced beyond the starting line. Even when an administration possesses the determination to address strategic objectives through art, cultural exchange, or projects that
communicate core democratic values embedded in American creative expression, the systems and structures required to carry out such programs may be too fragmented to be workable.

**What U.S. government department or agency is best positioned to lead a coordinated cultural diplomacy effort targeting post 9/11 challenges?**

Absent a policy hub, cultural diplomacy is always “last in, first out.” Well into the Cold War, the U.S. began to use scholarship, arts tours, and cultural exchange as a component in our global struggle against Soviet Communism. However, the brief Cold War commitment never translated into continuing positions of authority charged with implementing a cultural agenda. To this day, on a bipartisan basis, no cultural specialist sits on the President’s Cabinet, and neither the Domestic Policy Council nor the National Security Council boasts a “culture” line item on its agenda.

In a nation that does not possess a central cultural policy authority and which relies on the marketplace to dictate the terms of most cultural exchange, it should be no surprise that, within a few years of the end of the Cold War, the Voice of America’s budget was trimmed and the U.S. Information Agency was eliminated completely, its mandate and line item rolled up into that of the State Department. Without a designated advocate at the highest levels of the federal government, despite expressions of concern, we have been slow to implement any new program that might distribute a coherent and helpful view of American culture and society to the larger world for the long term.

**What U.S. government department or agency is best positioned to advocate on behalf of a sustained commitment to culture as an essential vehicle for advancing American interests around the world?**

The U.S. is tempted to address long-term challenges of cultural communication with short-term solutions such as advertising campaigns and branding. The decades-long political and economic competition with Soviet Communism that defined the Cold War provided a supportive backdrop for a long-term commitment to culture as a metaphor and mechanism for ideological conversion. While U.S. leadership has acknowledged the long-term character of the post-9/11 challenge of Islamic radicals, efforts in cultural and public diplomacy have to date been framed as advertising and public-relations initiatives. However,
evidence suggests that the global reach of commercial media has immunized non-elite populations against slogans, endorsements, and branding. It is unlikely that desired long-term results can be achieved when cultural diplomacy is framed as public relations.

Can the U.S. government sustain the political will required to achieve mutuality – trust-building, long-term relationships?

**International communication among elites suggests culture; communication with non-elite populations implies advertising.** In the 1930s, cosmopolitan leaders of government and industry were comfortable establishing a cultural diplomacy agenda that was intended to influence international elites by organizing tours for classical music, art exhibitions, scholars, and writers. Throughout the Cold War and to this day, leaders of America’s refined arts not-for-profit organizations have been the most vocal supporters of cultural diplomacy and cultural exchange. They continue to advocate for greater investment in the traditional cultural diplomacy strategy. However, if our task today is to reach non-elite populations, it is unlikely that “arts diplomacy,” as practiced during the Cold War, can produce desired outcomes. In fact, in some settings, the pursuit of diplomatic objectives by circulating cultural products that appeal to political, financial, and intellectual elites may actually be counterproductive. However, a media blitz is also not the answer. In a world immunized against consumer manipulation, it is unlikely that public relations, advertising campaigns, or attempts at branding can shift negative feelings toward the U.S.

What aspects of culture and what programming can be utilized to communicate U.S. ideals directly to non-elite populations?

**In conclusion:** The U.S. possesses a unique and powerful expressive life, admired democratic values, and habits of intellectual curiosity, individualism, and entrepreneurship that together constitute a powerful engine of diplomacy. However, despite an acknowledgement at the highest levels of government that we are engaged in a cultural struggle, the low public-policy priority generally afforded culture, combined with a multi-actor, highly privatized system of cultural production and exchange, has made it difficult for the U.S. to mount a coherent, large-scale cultural diplomacy effort tailored to contemporary challenges. Policy leaders must
engage and resolve structural complexities and philosophical uncertainties before an effective 21st century cultural policy agenda can be taken on.

Notes


2 See the “concise review of the basics of cultural diplomacy” provided at http://textus.diplomacy.edu/textusBin/BViewers/oview/culturaldiplomacy/oview.asp

3 As quoted in Helena K. Finn, “The Case for Cultural Diplomacy: Engaging Foreign Audiences,” Foreign Affairs, Volume 82 no. 6, p. 15.


5 Feigenbaum

6 Unpublished history of ties between the University of Michigan and Chinese higher education, Jinyun Liu and John Godfrey.

7 Feigenbaum, p. 28.

8 Ibid., p. 29.


10 Feigenbaum, p. 29.


13 Saunders, p. 2.

14 Yale Richmond, Cultural Exchange and the Cold War, State College: Pennsylvania State University Press, 2003

15 “History of the International Visitor Program”

16 Richmond


Cultural Diplomacy and The National Interest

23 See www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org for survey data.
25 Quoted in the Report of the 9-11 Commission
29 GAO, p. 8
30 Since its creation in 1999, no one has occupied the position for more than two years; its three previous occupants have all had backgrounds in political communications or advertising and little or no experience with cultural policy issues. Interestingly, all have been women.
31 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2004 Report, p. 27, and www.cultureconnect.state.gov. The full list of current Cultural Ambassadors: dancer/singer/actress Debbie Allen, opera singer Denyce Graves, Kennedy Center head and arts impresario Michael Kaiser, inventor Dean Kamen, architect Daniel Libeskind, cellist Yo-Yo Ma, jazz musician Wynton Marsalis, writer Frank McCourt, photographer Joel Meyerowitz, actress Doris Roberts, actor/director Ron Silver, baseball player Bernie Williams, singer Mary Wilson. One cannot help noting the absence of Arab- or Muslim-Americans as well as figures more recognizable to the world’s young people. New York Yankees slugger Bernie Williams, at 37, appears to be the youngest of the group.
33 Finn, p. 20
34 Evers.
36 “Finding America’s Voice,” p. 45
37 GAO, p. 3.
38 See http://www.amcorners.ru/
40 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2004 Report, p. 17
41 “Finding America’s Voice,” p. 46.
43 United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, 2004 Report, p. 27
44 Robin Wright and Al Kamen, “U.S. Outreach to Islamic World Gets Slow Start,

45 Ibid.

46 See, among others, United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy 2004 Report; also the website of USIA alumni, www.publicdiplomacy.org


50 These include the Report of the 9.11 Commission itself as well as multiple reports from the United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, the Council on Foreign Relations, and the General Accounting Office, among others.


52 Some of the ideas summarized in this section were suggested by Mark Leonard and Andrew Small with Martin Rose, “British Public Diplomacy in the ‘Age of Schisms,’ Counterpoint, The Foreign Policy Center, London, February 2005.

53 GAO


55 Evers


57 See www.google.com/corporate/facts.html


59 Dan Glickman, President, Motion Picture Association of America, Remarks to ShoWest 2005, March 15, 2005, p. 4.

60 Ibid, p. 8.

61 Ibid


63 Maule, p. 5

64 See www.mpaa.org/anti-piracy/content.htm

65 The central issue in recent years has been how US IPR policies also prevent countries from producing or purchasing generic drugs to deal with epidemic diseases such as AIDS, increasing by factors of five or ten the cost of dealing with epidemics.

66 Canada, for example, has developed its film industry as a less-expensive alternative to US locations – though arguably, not much is “Canadian” about the results; Bhagwati cites subsidy-based successes in rebuilding independent Korean film.


69 Ibid.

70 www.businessfordiplomaticaction.org
Georgetown University Art History professor and former US Ambassador to the Netherlands Cynthia Schneider, a strong advocate of cultural diplomacy, is perhaps the exception that proves the rule. Other political appointee ambassadors like her, with significant cultural expertise and connections, come and go without much ability to affect the policies of the State Department itself, as opposed to the activities at the post where they serve.


Related but beyond the scope of this piece is the growth in corporate charity and community involvement overseas, driven both by the need to present the company positively to US customers and shareholders, the need for good local image, and the perceived benefits for cohesion and morale when employees believe their company is a good global citizen.


Culturalpolicy.org and pdi.gwu.edu, respectively.

Publicdiplomacy.org and uscpublicdiplomacy.org, respectively


Ibid, p. 16


Reinhard, p. 11